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WHO'S SINGING THE MEXICALI BLUES:1
HOW FAR CAN THE EPA TRAVEL UNDER
THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1900s, the United States and Mexico have developed
a relationship primarily centered on promoting economic development
and foreign investment.2 From an economic standpoint, both countries
I. THE GRATEFUL DEAD, The Mexicali Blues, on THE BEST OF "SKELETONS FROM THE
CLOSET" (Warner Bros. Records Inc. 1974).
2. In the early twentieth century, the Mexican government encouraged the United
States to invest in Mexico. However, the American investment exceeded Mexico's
domestic investment, giving the United States economic strength and political power over
Mexico. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, Background U.S.-Mexico Trade Relations:
Historical Perspective, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS I 1 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 91-282E, Mar. 25, 1991)
[hereinafter NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS]. During the 1920s, under Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy," the United States adopted a policy of noninter-
vention which included demonstrating respect for Mexico's national sovereignty. Id.
Between 1952 and 1964, the United States and Mexico participated in the Bracero
Program which permitted Mexican nationals to provide agricultural labor in the United
States. Victoria L. Engfer et al., By-Products of Prosperity: Transborder Hazardous
Waste Issues Confronting the Maquiladora Industry, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819, 821
(199 1); M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, MEXICO'S MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY 1 (Congressional
Research Service Report No. 91-706E, Sept. 27, 1991) [hereinafter MAQUILADORA
INDUSTRY]. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. When the Bracero Program ended
in 1964, Mexico sought to forestall widespread unemployment by developing the
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have benefitted from this relationship? From an environmental
standpoint, however, the relationship has been disastrous.4 Since the
1960s, the 2,000-mile United States-Mexico border has become
maquiladora industry. See infra note 7 for a description of maquiladoras.
3. See infra notes 22-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of the past relationships between the United States and Mexico.
4. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. See generally James P. Duffy,, III,
The Environmental Implications of a North American Free Trade Agreement, 10 HOFSTRA
LAB. L.J. 561 (1993) (analyzing Mexico's regulatory system, international treaties,
NAFTA, and current environmental enforcement in Mexico); Phillip D. Hardberger,
Industrialization in the Borderlands and the NAFTA Treaty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 699(1993) (asserting that the United States and Mexico must work together to protect the
environment); James A. Funt, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Integrated Environmental Border Plan: Feasible Solutions to U.S.-Mexico Border
Pollution?, 12 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 77, 79 (1993) (examining the Integrated
Border Plan and "its unlikely effectiveness in alleviating environmental border concerns");
Farah Khakee, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Need to
Protect Transboundary Water Resources, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848 (1992-1993)
(proposing additional measures to preserve and prevent pollution of transboundary water
resources); Stephen M. Lerner, Comment, The Maquiladoras and Hazardous Waste: The
Effects Under NAFTA, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW 255 (1993) (discussing past U.S.-Mexican
cooperation regarding the environment). See infra part II for a discussion of environmen-
tal problems on the U.S.-Mexican border.
The United States and Mexico have been working together to control pollution. See
generallyNorth American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) (agreeing, inter alia, to develop and review
environmental emergency preparedness, to promote education in environmental matters,
and to assess environmental impacts); Agreement of Cooperation Between the United
States of America and the United Mexican States for Solution of the Border Sanitation
Problem at San Diego, Califomia-Tijuana, Baja California, July 18, 1985, U.S.-Mex.,
Annex 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,269, at 2-3 (agreeing to cooperate "to anticipate and consider the
effects and the consequences that the works planned may have" on the environment);
Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,
Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827, at 3 [hereinafter La Paz Agreement](agreeing "to adopt the appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and eliminate sources of
pollution in their respective territory which affect the border area of the other").
5. Chemical Emergency Preparedness Along US./Mexican Border Gets a Boost, Int'l
Env't. Daily (BNA), at D3 (Mar. 18, 1994). There are 14 pairs of United States-Mexico
sister cities along the border, such as Brownsville, Texas and Matamoros, Mexico; El Paso,
Texas and Juarez, Mexico; San Diego, California and Tijuana, Mexico; Calexico,
California and Mexicali, Mexico. Id. See also SECRETARIAT OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,
GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT: MEXICO'S PUBLIC VORKS
PROGRAM FOR THE BORDER REGION I (on file with author) (displaying a map of the sister
cities located on the United States-Mexico border); Lawrence A. Herzog, The U.S.-Mexico
Transffrontier Metropolis, Bus. MEX., Mar. 1992, at 14 (discussing the growth of cities
along international boundaries).
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increasingly over-populated and polluted with filthy air, overloaded
sewers, and contaminated drinking water.6  Maquiladoras-foreign-
owned business located in Mexico--have caused most of the border
pollution." The pollution, in turn, has crossed into the United States.9
In response to this problem, the Board of Supervisors of the County
of Imperial, California, pursuant to § 2620 of the Toxic Substance
Control Act (TSCA), ° petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and requested that it investigate the border pollution." The
6. Casey Bukro, On the Free-Trade Frontier: Environmental Problems Multiply on
Border, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1993, at Cl. The frontier's population was 9.5 million in
1993-what it was a decade earlier--and is expected to grow by another 900,000 by the
year 2000. Id. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of pollution
problems on the United States-Mexican border.
7. Maquiladoras are foreign-owned export manufacturing firms located in Mexico. See
Michael Connor, Comment, Maquiladoras and the Border Environment: Prospects for
Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 683 (1992).
An international agreement allows the maquiladoras to import component parts duty-
free: the assembled goods are exported, with tariffs levied only on the value added in
Mexico. See Companies Contemplate Options in Wake of Subpoenas for New River
Chemical Data, Int'l Env't. Daily (BNA), at D4 (Oct. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Companies
Contemplate]. If the finished item is assembled in Mexico of American-made components,
the taxable added value is only the labor and capital costs attributed to the assembly.
Susanna Peters, Comment, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing Between Workers'
Rights and Foreign Investment, I I CoMP. LAB. L.J. 226, 231-32 (1990). The bulk of the
maquiladoras are located along the U.S.-Mexican border. Companies Contemplate, supra.
Although most maquiladoras are operated by American companies, Japanese, German,
Swedish, Canadian, British, French, Korean, and Taiwanese companies all operate
maquiladoras in Mexico. See MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 9. See infra
part II for a discussion of the maquiladora industry.
8. See Bukro, supra note 6, at Cl (describing the role of maquiladoras in border
pollution).
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 2, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692
(1994)). Cites to TSCA provisions will provide both the TSCA section number and the
U.S.C. number. See TSCA § 21; 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (permitting any person to petition
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to initiate a proceeding for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule under selected sections of TSCA). See infra part III for
a discussion of TSCA.
11. Luke C. Hester, U.S. and Mexico to Conduct Joint Effort to Clean Up New River:
EPA Issues Administrative Subpoenas to U.S. Companies, EPA ENVTL. NEWS, Sept. 23,
1994, at 1. Imperial County, the Environmental Health Coalition, Comite Ciudadano Pro
Restauracion del Canon del Padre y Servicios Comunitarios, and the Southwest Network
for Environmental and Economic Justice petitioned the EPA to investigate the chemicals
polluting the border area. Id. at 1-2. In addition, the petitioners sought relief under
environmental provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). See
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petitioners were particularly concerned with the state of the New
River 2 and whether the pollution posed a threat to their health or
environment. 3 Specifically, the petitioners requested the EPA to issue
a test rule under § 2603 of TSCA,"4 and to monitor the New River for
the presence of hazardous chemicals.'
The EPA did not believe that a § 2603 test rule was appropriate and
instead proposed additional monitoring of the river in order to adequately
characterize the chemical contamination.' 6 Therefore, the EPA, pursuant
to § 2610,17 issued subpoenas to ninety-five American companies
California County's Test Rule Request Denied; EPA Offers to Help Pay for New River
Monitoring, Cal. Env't Daily (BNA), at D2 (Mar. 25, 1994) [hereinafter Test Rule Request
Denied]. They also petitioned the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR) for a health assessment of the New River under section 104 of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Id. In
addition to seeking relief under NAFTA and TSCA, the Environmental Health Coalition
sought relief under President Clinton's Executive Order 12,898 on environmental justice.
See Coalition Withdraws Petition that Urged EPA to Address Pollution in New River, Cal.
Env't Daily (BNA), at D2 (June 10, 1994).
12. The New River flows north from Mexicali, Mexico into the Imperial Valley of
California. Companies Contemplate, supra note 7, at D4. See also Michael Riley, Dead
Cats, Toxins, and Typhoid, TIME, Apr. 20, 1987, at 68 (noting sightings of dead cats,
chickens, tires, slaughterhouse waste, laundry suds, human feces, and a dead body floating
in the New River).
13. Hester, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Notice of Receipt of Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. 3687 (1994) (describing issues raised
by the petition). The EPA may issue rules requiring chemical manufactures and processors
to test chemical substances and mixtures to develop data regarding health and environmen-
tal effects. TSCA § 4(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1994).
15. California County Supervisors File Section 21 Petition for New River Testing,
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), at D12 (Jan. 26, 1994). The petition urged the EPA to test the
chemicals in the river, and to take appropriate action under TSCA.
16. TSCA Section 21 Citizens' Petition; Response to Citizens' Petition, 59 Fed. Reg.
13,721, 13,723 (1994) [hereinafter Response to Petition].
17. TSCA § 11(c); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c) (1994) (allowing the EPA to issue subpoenas
and "require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of reports,
papers, documents, answers to questions, and other information"). See also TSCA § 11 (a);
15 U.S.C. §2610(a) (permitting the EPA to "inspect any establishment, facility, or other
premises in which chemical substances, mixtures, or products ... are manufactured,
processed, stored, or held before or after their distribution in commerce"). See generally
RAY M. DRULEY & GIRARD L. ORDWAY, THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (1977)
(discussing TSCA and its legislative history); MARY D. WOROBEC, Toxic SUBSTANCES
CONTROLS PRIMER: FEDERAL REGULATION OF CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 13
(1984) (stating that Congress intended TSCA to complete the chain of United States
environmental laws passed in the previous years); COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, TOXIC
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operating maquiladoras in Mexico, requesting information regarding the
chemicals the maquiladoras were dumping into the New River." The
EPA hoped to determine whether the chemicals posed a risk to the
environment. 9 These subpoenas were the first cross-the-border actions
that the EPA undertook to control pollution." The American parent
companies, however, contended that the EPA's jurisdiction under TSCA
did not extend to companies manufacturing or processing chemicals
outside the United States.2
This Note examines whether the EPA has authority under TSCA to
issue subpoenas to the American parent companies operating
maquiladoras in Mexico. Part II describes the history of the Maquiladora
Program and the environmental crisis along the United States-Mexico
border. Part III analyzes TSCA's purpose, policy, and provisions. Part
IV provides a brief overview of an Agency's investigative powers. Part
V discusses whether the EPA properly interpreted its power under TSCA
and proposes that the EPA did not have the authority to subpoena the
American parent companies. In addition, Part V asserts that courts
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LAW AND EXPLANATION (1977) (providing a comprehensive
view of TSCA).
18. Marianne Lavelle, EPA Probes Cross-Border Contamination, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
10, 1994, at B1. Prior to issuing the subpoenas, the EPA asked the firms to report the
information voluntarily; however, only four firms complied. 95 U.S. Firms Get Subpoenas
for Data on Chemicals Produced Along Mexican Border, Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 803
(Sept. 23, 1994) [hereinafter 95 US. Firms]. See also Administrative Subpoena Duces
Tecum from the Environmental Protection Agency to United States Parent Companies, at
7-9 (Sept. 21, 1994) (on file with author) (requesting the following information: data
describing the chemical substances used; the quantity of chemical substances released into
the environment by underground injection, stack or non-point air emissions, or catastrophic
or accidental events; the quantity of chemical substances exported; the quantity transferred
off-site for recycling; and any unpublished health and safety data, medical surveillance
information, or allegations of significant adverse effects to health).
19. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,723.
20. Lavelle, supra note 18, at B I.
21. Industry Contests EPA Callfor Data from Foreign Facilities of U.S. Firms, INSIDE
EPA, Sept. 30, 1994, at 16 (citing industry sources as calling the subpoena "an overly
broad interpretation" of TSCA, used to regulate foreign commerce); Letter from Stanley
W. Landfair, attorney for McKenna & Cuneo to President or General Counsel, Ralston
Purina Co. (Sept. 30, 1994) (on file with author) (questioning-in a form letter to all
subpoenaed parent companies-the EPA's subpoena authority; how the EPA intends to
make use of the information; whether the EPA believes the U.S. companies are financially
responsible for the pollution caused by other companies outside the United States; and
whether the Mexican-owned factories are being ignored by the EPA).
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should not enforce EPA subpoenas to the American parent companies
because the EPA cannot extend TSCA regulations extraterritorially to the
maquiladoras in Mexico.
II. THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE BORDER ENVIRONMENT
Prior to 1965, Mexicans could work as agricultural laborers in the
United States under the Bracero Program.' When the Bracero Program
ended, unemployment increased; the Mexican Border Industrialization
Program (BIP)' established the Maquiladora Program to help cure the
country's economic problems.24 The BIP's goals were to (1) create new
jobs, increase incomes, and improve the standard of living for border-
area workers, (2) increase labor skills, and (3) decrease Mexico's trade
deficit.'
Under the Maquiladora Program, the BIP solicited foreign-owned
businesses to set up manufacturing plants in Mexico for the purpose of
producing exports. 26 The Mexican government established free-trade
rules that attracted foreign investment in the program. Specifically,
the government exempted maquiladoras from majority ownership laws
and relaxed restrictions on foreign ownership of real estate near its
22. Pub. L. No. 82-78, ch. 223, 65 Stat. 119 (1951) (permitting Mexican nationals to
work in the United States to remedy domestic-labor shortage).
23. See Michael E. Bulson, Comment, Mexico's Border Industrial Program: Legal
Guidelines for the Foreign Investor 4 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 89, 89-90 (1974).
24. MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 1. See also Elizabeth C. Rose, Note,
Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Management Problems and Mexico's
Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L L. 223, 229 (1989) (discussing the Bracero Program's effect on
the employment rate in Mexico and the creation of the Maquiladora Program).
25. Peters, supra note 7, at 230. See also Sherri M. Durand, American Maquiladoras:
Are They Exploiting Mexico's Working Poor?, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 128 (1994)
(examining the advantages and disadvantages of the Maquiladora Program for Mexican
workers).
26. MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 1. Prior to the formal establishment
of the Maquiladora Program, U.S. companies wishing to manufacture components in
Mexico entered into private contracts with Mexican landowners who agreed to build
industrial parks on their land. lI
27. James R. Gallop & Christopher J. Graddock, Note, The North American Free
Trade Agreement: Economic Integration and Employment Dislocation, 19 J. LEGIs. 265,
277 (1993) (examining the potential for loss of labor-intensive jobs in the United States
due to NAFTA).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/10
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
borders and coastlines.' Further, as long as the maquiladoras exported
their final products, the government allowed foreign companies to import
component parts duty free. 29 Once the maquiladora produced a final
product, the parent company would import the goods back into the
United States, paying an import tariff only on the value added in
Mexico.3" Other advantages offered to maquiladoras included the
following: few restrictions on items produced for export,3 low
minimum wage paid to Mexican workers,32 and exemption from the
Mexican corporate taxes.33
The Maquiladora Program continues to be one of Mexico's major
economic successes.34 The maquiladora industry has been Mexico's
second largest source of hard currency, 35 and is a source of new
technology and training.36 The program has already generated 600,000
28. Id.
29. Id. See Rose, supra note 24, at 229. Foreign manufacturers could import, duty-
free, all machinery, materials (including raw chemicals), equipment, and to-be-assembled
components. Id. When the maquiladoras ceased operation, they were required to remove
all equipment from Mexico. MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 1.
30. Peters, supra note 7, at 231-32. See also Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States, USITC Pub. 2937, Prov. 9802.00.80 (1996) (imposing a duty on the total
value of the products, less the costs of the United States components for United States
components assembled in foreign countries).
31. Rose, supra note 24, at 229. The Mexican law has an exception for textiles
because this industry competes directly with Mexican-owned industries. Id.
32. Id. Intemal growth under the Maquiladora Program was slow because, due to the
overvalued currency, Mexico's real wages were among the highest in developing countries.
MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 1. Eventually, the peso lost ,value and
Mexican wages declined to $.98/hour, compared to $13.85, the average hourly U.S.
manufacturing rate. Mary Jane Bolle, Wage Disparities: The United States v. Mexico, in
NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 33.
33. Durand, supra note 25, at 129 (discussing various Mexican corporate forms
available to American maquiladoras).
34. MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 7. But see Durand, supra note 25, at
130-32 (examining the possible negative impact of the maquiladoras on Mexican workers).
Maquiladoras produced about $12.7 billion worth of goods in 1989, providing the Mexican
economy with about $2 billion in value-added income. Id. (citing Mariah E. DeForest,
Manufacturing in Mexico, TWIN PLANT NEws, June 1991, at 28).
35. Lawrence Kootnikoff, Coming Together: Forging the World's Largest Free-Trade
Zone, Bus. MEX., Mar. 1991, at 4, 8.
36. MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 7. (noting a shift from light assembly
operations to sophisticated industrial processes and fully integrated manufacturing such as
robotics).
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jobs,37 and the number of Mexicans employed in the industry continues
to grow between ten and twenty percent annually.38 Unfortunately, this
rapid growth in population and industrial development creates additional
pressures on the border's infrastructure and sewage system,39 resulting
in a serious pollution problem.4" Mexico's relaxed environmental
regulations further contribute to the border pollution.4
Several factors contribute to the maquiladoras' poor environmental
record: plant managers are often unaware of the Mexican legislation's
requirements; the companies do not formulate comprehensive compliance
policies, instead relying on individual managers' decisions; and plant
managers fail to monitor the practices of contractors hired to dispose of
37. Jonathan Ferguson, Mexicans Want Jobs, Not Exploitation, TORONTO STAR, Feb.
7, 1993, at B4. Maquiladoras account for most of the jobs created in Mexico since 1980.
See MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 7.
38. See MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that three see-
tors-electronics, transportation, and electrical machinery-accounted for over 50% of
maquiladora employment in 1987).
39. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,722. Domestic sewage, agricultural
drainage, and industrial wastewater all enter the New River from Mexicali. Id. Many
communities not yet connected to the sewage treatment system dump an average of eight
million gallons of sewage per day into the New River. Id. Mexican law requires
industries to treat waste prior to discharging it to minimize the impact on the sewer system
and receiving waters. Id. However, data indicate significant industrial waste in the River.
Id. See Francisco Alba, Mexico's Northern Border: A Framework of Reference, 22 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 749, 750-51 (1982) (examining conditions on the U.S.-Mexico border,
including shortages and deficiencies in housing, employment, and public utilities). See
also Herzog, supra note 5, at 15 (detailing the growth of the border area and its unique
"social system").
40. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,722. The EPA believes that industrial
discharges are only one element among several sources of pollution. Id. Untreated
sewage and agricultural runoff also contribute to the degradation of the area. 95 U.S.
Firms, supra note 18, at 804. See generally Engfer et al., supra note 2 (examining the
procedures for shipping hazardous wastes across the border); Mary Tiemann, Environ-
mental Concerns, in NAFTA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 45 (noting health
concerns for populations in Mexican border communities).
41. Daniel I. Basurto Gonzales & Elaine F. Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of
Maquiladora Operations: A Note of Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 659 (1991) (examining the application of Mexican environmental laws and
regulations to maquiladora operations). Although modeled after American laws, Mexican
environmental laws are not strictly enforced. Engfer et al., supra note 2, at 825. A year
after the Mexican government enacted environmental regulations, 6% of the maquiladoras
met licensing requirements; three years later, 54.6% of the plants received licenses. Dr.
Roberto A. Sanchez, Maquila Masquerade, Bus. MEX., Special Issue, 1993, at 13, 14;
Dane Schiller, The Maquila Industry--Where to Now?, Bus. MEX., Dec. 1991, at 48, 51.
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toxic manufacturing by-products.42 Three major types of risks result
from the maquiladoras inadequate exercise of control: (1) inadequate
handling of toxic and dangerous residues poses an environmental risk;
(2) storing, transporting, handling, and disposing of harmful chemicals
and toxic residues creates public health risks; and (3) handling the
hazardous chemicals in the plants exposes workers to increased health
risks.43 Environmentalists, private citizens, and politicians on both sides
of the border now demand better environmental controls be exerted over
the maquiladoras to protect public health and the environment.'
The governments of Mexico and the United States have concentrated
several initiatives on the border region's development and consequent
pollution problems. 45  Most recently, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations have heightened national concerns
regarding transborder environmental conditions, resulting in new
initiatives. 46 Historically, many factors have undermined the effective-
ness of past attempts to improve border conditions.47 It is too soon to
predict the success of the NAFTA-related environmental initiatives on
long-standing, rapidly-worsening border conditions.4 In the meantime,
42. Sanchez, supra note 41, at 15.
43. Id. at 13.
44. See id.
45. See Sandford E. Gaines, Bridges to a Better Environment: Building Cross-Border
Institutions for Environmental Improvement in the U.S-Mexico Border Area, 12 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 429, 444 (1995) (discussing bilateral agreements related to border
issues); Arnoldo Medina, Jr., Comment, NAFTA and Petroleum Development in the Gulf
of Mexico: The Needfor a Bilateral Oil Spill Response Regime Between the United States
and Mexico, 6 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y, 405, 411 (1995) (listing examples of
bilateral agreement preceding NAFTA). See also supra note 4.
46. Gaines, supra note 45, at 431-32 (discussing NAFTA-related environmental
initiatives).
47. Id. at 444-48. Gaines states:
The missing ingredient [in pre-NAFTA initiatives] was a strong and well-informed
concern at high levels of either government about the general pattern of environmen-
tal pollution and degradation in the border area sufficient to inspire bilateral
environmental commitments to broad goals and programs and the establishment of
suitable institutions for overseeing and carrying out such commitments.
Id. at 446. Gaines recommends devolving authority over environmental management to
state and local governments. Id. He notes that the border communities have close
economic and social ties and, thus, greater opportunities for transborder cooperation. Id.
at 445.
48. Id. at 469.
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American citizens have turned to the citizen-petition provisions in
existing environmental legislation in an attempt to prod United States
agencies into using their regulatory powers to redress chronic health
threats caused by cross-border pollution.49
In January, 1994, the citizens of Southern California petitioned the
EPA to issue a § 2603 rule"0 pursuant to TSCA requiring environmental
testing to address the pollution problem.5' Although the EPA declined
to issue a § 2603 test ruling, it agreed to monitor the border pollution
and identify the pollutants in the New River.52 The EPA issued ninety-
five subpoenas to American companies operating maquiladoras in
Mexico,53 seeking information about chemicals issued into the New
River.5 4 The EPA and the Mexican Secretariat for Social Development
(SEDESOL) 5 both consider the clean-up of the United States-Mexican
border a high priority.56
III. THE ToxIc SUBSTANCE CONTROL ACT
Prior to 1976, federal environmental laws focused on controlling
hazardous discharge and cleaning up polluted sites.5 Examples include
the Clean Air Act,5" the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 9 and
49. See Notice of Receipt of Petition, 59 Fed. Reg. 3687 (1994) (noting citizen-petition
filed pursuant to TSCA § 21; 15 U.S.C. § 2620).
50. See supra note 14.
51. Test Rule Request Denied, supra note 11, at D2.
52. Id.
53. Lavelle, supra note 18, at B1.
54. Id.
55. SEDESOL was formed in 1992, replacing the Urban Development and Ecology
Secretariat. Duffy, supra note 4, at 563. For a discussion of the impact of the
restructuring on environmental oversight, see Terzah N. Lewis, Comment, Environmental
Law in Mexico, 21 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 159, 159 n.* (1992).
56. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,722.
57. Andrew Hanan, Pushing the Environmental Regulatory Focus a Step Back:
Controlling the Introduction of New Chemicals Under the Toxic Substances Control Act,
18 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 396 (1992) (explaining the ineffectiveness of TSCA).
58. Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 771 Stat. 392 (1955) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7671q (1994)) (regulating the discharge of pollutants into the atmosphere).
59. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1970) (current version at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994)) (regulating the discharge of pollutants into water).
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the Occupational Safety and Health Act?°  In passing these acts,
Congress concentrated on discrete sources of pollution.6' By targeting
sources, the laws failed to protect public health from overall exposures
to hazardous chemicals, regardless of their source.62
In 1976, Congress concluded that exposure to a large number of
hazardous chemicals "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment." 3  In response to this determination
Congress enacted TSCA, the first comprehensive legislation to govern
toxic substances." Congress designed the statute to regulate the safe
use of all raw materials, rather than the control of finished products or
processed waste.65 Under TSCA, the EPA monitors all new chemical
substances entering the market.6
TSCA regulates 67 the manufacture,68 processing,69 distribution
60. Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1994)) (monitoring occupational exposure to hazardous substances).
61. The existing environmental laws regulated discrete targets, such as discharge pipes
and belching smokestacks. Richard A. Ginsburg, TSCA's Unfulfilled Mandate for
Comprehensive Regulation of Toxic Substances-The Potential of TSCA § 21 Citizens'
Petitions, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,330, 10,332 (Nov. 1986) (expressing
concerns that the existing statutes "failed to account for 'the total human exposure to a
[hazardous] substance and the total effect [these substances have] on the environment')
(quoting COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY TOXIC SUBSTANCES 20 (1971)).
62. Hanan, supra note 57, at 396. Hazardous chemicals can enter the stream of
commerce and cause serious forms of disease, including cancers, gene mutations, and birth
defects. Id. at 397.
63. TSCA § 2(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (1994).
64. ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL
217 (3d ed. 1992) (noting that TSCA "is hardly a masterpiece of insightful policy making
or incisive drafting").
65. See WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 13 (noting TSCA purpose to control exposure to
and use of raw industrial chemicals that fall outside other environmental laws). See also
Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 10,332 (concluding that the EPA should not be limited to
repairing environmental damage, and that humans and the environment should not be used
as a "laboratory for discovering adverse health effects") (quoting COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Toxic SUBSTANCES 21 (1971)); Hanan, supra note 57, at 396
("Congress sought to control hazardous inputs in order to reduce exposures, rather than
exclusively focus on the outputs and by-products of the industrial process.").
66. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 13.
67. TSCA § 6(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (detailing the scope of the regulation).
68. TSCA § 3(7); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(7) (defining the term "manufacture" as "to import
into the customs territory of the United States .... produce, or manufacture").
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in commerce, 70 use, and disposal of all chemicals the EPA finds present
an unreasonable risk to health or the environment.7' Congress stated
three policy goals: First, manufacturers and processors of chemical
substances are required to7" gather and develop adequate data concern-
ing the effects their chemicals have on health and the environment."
Second, chemicals posing "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment" should be regulated.74 Finally, regulation should not,
however, create unnecessary barriers to technological innovation.75
Thus, in devising regulations, the EPA must balance the environmental,
economic, and social impacts of its actions76 with the risks and benefits
of the chemical.77
Several key provisions implement TSCA's policy goals:78 First,
section 5 requires the EPA to screen all new chemicals entering the
market.79 Second, section 4 requires manufacturers to test existing and
69. TSCA § 3(10); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(10) (defining the term "process" as "the
preparation of a chemical substance or mixture, after its manufacture, for distribution in
commerce").
70. TSCA § 3(4); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(4) (defining the term "distribute in commerce" as
"to sell ... ; to introduce or deliver for introduction into commerce ... ; or to hold ...
after ... introduction into commerce"). See also TSCA § 3(3); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(3)
(defining the term "commerce" as "trade, traffic, transportation, or other commerce
between a place in a State and any place outside of such State").
71. TSCA § 2(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2).
72. For the purpose of this Note, a manufacturer means a processor or importer of
chemical substances.
73. TSCA § 2(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).
74. TSCA § 2(b)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
75. TSCA § 2(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3). Specifically, this section provides that
the exercise of regulating authority should not "impede unduly or create unnecessary
economic barriers to technological innovation while fulfilling the primary purpose of this
chapter to assure that.. . such chemical[s] ... do not present an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment." Id
76. TSCA § 2(c); 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c).
77. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 17. "The agency may decide that a substance poses
no unreasonable risk, that a substance should not be controlled because its benefits
outweigh its risks, or that risks posed by a substance are too great to be acceptable." Id.
The EPA can regulate chemicals by requiring hazard warning labels; banning manufac-
ture, use, or import; imposing specific controls on use or manufacture; or taking court
action to protect the public health or the environment. Id. at 18.
78. See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 64, at 218 (discussing TSCA §§ 4, 5, and 6).
See supra notes 72-77 (discussing TSCA's policy goals).
79. TSCA § 5; 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
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new chemicals that pose a potential risk to health or the environment.80
Third, section 6 requires the EPA to exercise regulatory control over
those chemicals that pose an unreasonable risk.8 Fourth, section 8
requires the EPA to keep an inventory of all chemicals processed or
manufactured in the United States.82 Thus, TSCA permits EPA to
monitor all chemicals-existing or new-before, during, and after their
manufacture.83
TSCA creates several benefits: First, the EPA can identify and
prevent the production or use of chemicals that present an unreasonable
risk.8" Second, premanufacture notice requirements 5 prevent a manu-
facturer from promoting a chemical that is likely to create an impermissi-
ble danger; thus the manufacturer can avoid an unnecessary invest-
ment." By stopping production of a chemical it determines poses an
unreasonable risk, the manufacturer decreases its exposure to civil suits
80. TSCA § 4; 15 U.S.C. § 2603.
81. TSCA § 6; 15 U.S.C. § 2605. TSCA does not define unreasonable risk.
According to the legislative history, an unreasonable risk is determined by
balancing the probability that harm will occur and the magnitude and severity of that
harm against the effect of proposed regulatory action on the availability to society of
the benefits of the substance or mixture, taking into account the availability of
substitutes for the substance or mixture which do not require regulation, and other
adverse effects which such proposed action may have on society.
H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 14 (1976).
82. TSCA § (8); 15 U.S.C. § 2607. The EPA must promulgate rules that require
manufactures to maintain records so that the EPA can request them. TSCA § 8(a)(1)(A)-
(B); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(aX1)(A)-(B).
83. But see TSCA § 5(h)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) (exempting chemicals
manufactured in small quantities solely for research and development); TSCA § 9(a); 15
U.S.C. § 2608(a) (exempting chemicals controlled by different environmental laws). See,
e.g., The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994) (controlling pesticides); The Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g-4
(1994) (controlling nuclear materials); The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994) (controlling food, drugs, and cosmetics). See also TSCA
§ 3(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B) (excluding from the definition of "chemical substance,"
any mixture, pesticide, tobacco, nuclear materials, and food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices
regulated by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
84. Hanan, supra note 57, at 407.
85. TSCA requires premanufacture notification for new chemicals or for significant
new uses of existing chemicals. TSCA § 5(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1). This
requirement ensures the regulation of all potentially hazardous chemicals from their
inception. Hanan, supra note 57, at 406. See infra part III.A.
86. Hanan, supra note 57, at 407.
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and clean-up costs."
A. Section Five of the Toxic Substance Control Act
Section 5 of TSCA is the most important section of the Act.88 It
requires a manufacturer or importer89 to submit a premanufacture notice
(PMN) to the EPA.' The PMN notifies the EPA that a person intends
to manufacture or import a new chemical9' or use an existing chemical
in a significantly new manner.' The PMN must provide sufficient
information for the EPA to determine whether the chemical presents an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.93
87. Id. at 408.
88. See, e.g., Robert A. Wyman, Jr., Note, Control of Toxic Substances: The Attempt
to Harmonize the Notification Requirements of the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act and
the European Community Sixth Amendment, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 417, 426 (1980)
(describing section 5 as the "keystone" of TSCA).
89. See TSCA § 3(7); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(7) (defining manufacture to include import);
Premanufacture Notification, 40 C.F.R. § 720.22(b)(1) (1995) (defining an importer as any
person intending to import a new chemical into the United States for commercial
purposes).
90. TSCA § 5(a)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(B). See WOROBEC, supra note 17, at
18-23 (noting that all PMNs must include the common or trade name of the chemical, the
chemical's identity and molecular structure, the estimated production levels, the proposed
use of the chemical, the method of disposing of the chemical, the estimated level of
exposure in the workplace, a description of the chemical's by-products, any available test
data on health and environmental effects, and a description of known or reasonably
ascertainable test data). See also Premanufacture Notification, 40 C.F.R. § 720.22
(requiring all persons intending to manufacture or import chemicals to submit a PMN);
Premanufacture Notification, 40 C.F.R. § 720 (1995) (establishing procedures for reporting
new chemicals); Premanufacture Notification Exemptions, 40 C.F.R. § 723 (exempting,
inter alia, chemicals manufactured in small quantities).
91. A new chemical is any chemical substance not included on the EPA's inventory
list. TSCA § 3(9); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(9).
92. TSCA § 5(a)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(B). The statute requires the EPA to
consider several factors in determining whether a proposed use of an existing chemical is
a "significant new use." The factors include: how much of the chemical substance the
manufacturer will process; the degree to which the new use changes the type, amount,
duration, or form of exposure of humans and the environment to the substance; and the
methods of processing and disposing of the chemical. TSCA § 5(a)(2)(A)-(D); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2604(a)(2)(A)-(D).
93. See Wyman, supra note 88, at 427. See supra note 90 and accompanying text
(discussing the required elements of a PMN). For a discussion of how the EPA
determines that a chemical poses an unreasonable risk, see infra notes 108-13 and
accompanying text.
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After receiving the PMN, the EPA must evaluate the hazards that
the chemical poses and make an independent risk assessment.94 In
assessing the risk, the EPA examines the toxicity of the new chemical,
and the probability of exposing humans or the environment to that new
chemical.95 If a new chemical presents an unreasonable risk, the EPA
has several options under TSCA. The EPA may approve the new
chemical,' extend the notice period,97 or seek a court order banning
manufacture of the chemical." If the EPA permits the new chemical's
manufacture, it may require the manufacturer to maintain records of all
the ill effects caused by the chemical." In addition, under section 6(a),
the EPA may restrict or limit the use of the new chemical, and require
the manufacturer to take certain precautionary measures."° Finally, the
EPA may permit the manufacture of the new chemical, but require
further review if the conditions of production change.''
94. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 20 (noting that the EPA conducts evaluations by
reviewing chemical literature and checking the known effects of chemicals having similar
composition). See generally Carolyne R. Hathaway et al., 4 Practitioner's Guide to the
Toxic Substances Control Act: Part 1, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,207, 10,215-22
(May, 1994) [hereinafter Hathaway, Part 1] (describing TSCA § 5); Carolyne R. Hathaway
et al., A Practitioner's Guide to the Toxic Substances Control Act: Part 11, 24 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,293, 10,285-90 (June 1994) [hereinafter Hathaway, Part 11]
(discussing consent orders under TSCA § 5).
95. See Wyman, supra note 88, at 430. In addition, the EPA considers "the costs and
the economic impact of reducing or eliminating the risk, . . . the impact on the national
economy and small business; the economic and social benefits associated with production
and use of [the chemical]; and the availability of substitute chemicals or non-chemical
alternatives." l (alteration in original) (quoting TSCA § 5(f); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f)).
96. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 20. The manufacturer may then begin production and
the EPA will add the new chemical to its inventory of existing chemicals. Id.
97. See Hathaway, Part 1, supra note 94, at 10,216 (discussing three mechanisms by
which the EPA may extend the notice periods and postpone manufacture).
98. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 21-22. The EPA may seek a court order banning the
production of the new chemical either until it receives further information concerning the
chemical, or until a formal ban is imposed. Id. at 21. TSCA § 6 authorizes the EPA to
seek such formal bans through the rulemaking process. TSCA § 6(c); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(c). Because this process is quite lengthy, the EPA may seek injunctive relief to
bar manufacture before such a rule is promulgated. TSCA § 5(e)-(f); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)-(M.
99. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 22. The monitoring process requires formal
rulemaking, which can take up to three years. Id. at 23.
100. TSCA § 5(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
101. TSCA § 6(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(2). See also WOROBEC, supra note 17, at
22-23. This is called the "significant new use" rule. Id. at 22. If a manufacturer changes
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B. Section Four of the Toxic Substance Control Act
Under section 4 the EPA can require a manufacturer to test
identified chemicals and mixtures 2 in accordance with applicable EPA
test rules. 3 Before the manufacturer performs such tests, however, the
EPA must establish that the information currently available is not
sufficient to assess the chemical's ill effects,"° and that further testing
of the chemical is the only way to develop this information. 05 In
addition, the EPA must establish that the chemical presents an unreason-
able risk of injury to health or the environment, 0 6 or prove that the
quantity produced is so substantial that significant exposure to humans
and the environment is reasonably expected. 7
To determine whether a chemical poses an unreasonable risk, the
EPA must find that the chemical presents a hazard, as well as a risk, and
that this risk is unreasonable.' A chemical is considered a hazard if
it may potentially effect humans or the environment."° If the EPA
the use of a chemical, it must notify the EPA, and the EPA must re-evaluate the substance.
Id. See Hathaway, Part 1, supra note 94, at 10,215-22.
102. The EPA can require testing for environmental and ecological effects, and acute
or chronic health effects, including cancer, gene mutations, birth defects, and behavioral
changes. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 24.
103. TSCA § 4(b); 15 U.S.C. 2603(b). See, e.g., Chloromethane and Chlorinated
Benzenes Proposed Test Rule: Amendment to Proposed Health Effects Standards, 45 Fed.
Reg. 48,524, 48,525 (1980) [hereinafter Proposed Test Rule] (imposing a test rule requires
identifying the chemical substances and mixtures to be tested, providing standards for the
development of test data, and designating deadlines for the submission of data developed
under the rule).
104. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(A)(ii); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(ii).
105. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(A)(iii); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(l)(A)(iii).
106. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(A)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i). See Hathaway, Part 11,
supra note 94, at 10,291-92 (discussing "unreasonable risk" findings).
107. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(B)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i). See Hathaway, Part 11,
supra note 94, at 10,292-93 (discussing "substantial quantities" findings).
108. Marko M. G. Slusarczuk, Note, The Environmental Implications of an Emerging
Energy Technology: Photovoltaic Solar Cells-A Study of the Toxic Aspects, 9 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 889, 926 (1981) (examining how TSCA affects three semiconductor
materials used in solar cells).
109. Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. at 48,528. The EPA considers physical and
chemical properties, structural similarity to chemicals with known adverse effects, results
from previous testing of the compound, and anecdotal and clinical reports of injury. Id.
Determining whether a chemical presents a hazard is not based on definitive scientific data,
but on reasonable scientific assumptions, extrapolations, and interpolations. Id. See
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/10
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
finds the chemical is a hazard, it must then determine whether the
chemical poses a risk."' The EPA will find a risk where a possibility
of exposing humans or the environment to that chemical exists."'
Finally, if the hazardous chemical poses a risk, the EPA must determine
whether the risk is unreasonable." 2 In determining whether a risk is
unreasonable, the EPA balances the severity and probability of harm to
humans or the environment, against the likely benefits to be derived from
the use of the chemical." 3
The Interagency Testing Committee (ITC)," 4 and private citi-
zens" 5 can request the EPA to order a manufacturer to test a chemi-
cal." 6 If the EPA concludes that a test is necessary, it must first
Slusarczuk, supra note 108, at 926 (referring to toxic, carcinogenic, mutagenic, and
teratogenic effects as "hazardous").
S110. The EPA examines the toxicity and exposure to determine whether a chemical
presents a risk. Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. at 48,528 ("The hazard potential of a
chemical is only part of the risk equation.... There is usually an inverse relationship
between hazard and exposure .. "). See also DRULEY & ORDWAY, supra note 17, at 30
(explaining that risk of injury may occur from a chemical's manufacture, distribution in
commerce, processing, use, or disposal).
I l1. Slusarczuk, supra note 108, at 927. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 859 F.2d
977, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (endorsing the Agency's contention that potential human
exposure is sufficient to support a § 4(a)(1)(A) finding).
112. Slusarczuk, supra note 108, at 926.
113. Id. at 927. See, e.g., Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. at 48,528.
114. TSCA § 4(e)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(1)(A) (establishing the ITC to make
recommendations to the EPA regarding the testing of certain chemicals and granting the
committee the authority to give the EPA a priority list for promulgating rules). See
generally TSCA § 4(eX2)(AXi)-(viii); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(2)(A)(i)-(viii) (listing the
committee members); TSCA § 4(eXl)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(1)(A) (granting the EPA
a year to respond to the ITC's list). See also WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 25-26
(describing the committee's functions).
In establishing priority chemicals, the committee considers all relevant factors, including
the quantity manufactured, the quantity emitted into the environment, the number of
individuals exposed and the duration of the exposure, whether the chemical is closely
related to a substance that is known to cause an unreasonable risk of injury, the amount
of data available, whether testing will develop data, and the availability of facilities and
personnel to conduct the testing. TSCA § 4(e)(1)(A)(i)-(viii); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2603(e)(l)(A)(i)-(viii).
115. TSCA § 21; 15 U.S.C. § 2620. The EPA must respond to a citizens' petition
within 90 days. TSCA § 21(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(3). See also WOROBEC, supra
note 17, at 26-27. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing the citizen
petition regarding the New River).
116. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 25-27.
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promulgate a test rule for the manufacturer to follow."7  TSCA
requires that all manufacturers of a particular chemical" 8 perform the
test and that they all follow the standards prescribed by the test.'
After completing such a test, the manufacturer must submit the data it
gathered to the EPA for publication in the Federal Register.'2" If the
EPA concludes that the chemical poses an unreasonable risk, it must
regulate the chemical' 2' by enforcing the least burdensome regula-
tion." If the EPA determines that the chemical does not pose an
unreasonable risk, it must explain its findings and rationale."
C. Section Six of the Toxic Substance Control Act
The EPA controls a chemical by promulgating a rule. 24 In doing
117. TSCA § 4(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a). See DRULEY & ORDWAY, supra note 17, at
31 (promulgating a rule requires the EPA to consider the cost of the tests and the
availability of test facilities). See also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1994) (outlining rulemaking procedures).
118. TSCA § 4(b)(3)(B)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(3)(B)(i). The EPA may allow two
or more manufacturers to designate one qualified tester. TSCA § 4(b)(3)(A); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2603(b)(3)(A). See WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 27 (discussing cost sharing). See also
Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. at 48,526 (discussing TSCA § 4(b)(3)(A)).
119. DRULEY & ORDWAY, supra note 17, at 30-31. The testing rule prescribes
standards for developing the test data, and requires testing for toxicity, persistency, and
other health and environmental effects. The rule may also prescribe test protocols and
methodologies. Id.
120. TSCA § 14; 15 U.S.C. § 2613. See Hathaway, Part 11, supra note 94, at 10,301
(discussing requirements to submit information to the EPA).
121. TSCA § 6(a); 15 U.S.C § 2605(a) (permitting the EPA to control or ban specific
chemicals that pose an unreasonable risk to health or the environment); TSCA § 7; 15
U.S.C. § 2606 (permitting the EPA to regulate imminent hazards).
122. TSCA § 6(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). See, e.g., TSCA § 6(a)(1) (prohibiting or
limiting the amount of a chemical which may be manufactured, processed, or distributed);
§ 6(a)(2) (prohibiting or limiting the chemical to a particular use); § 6(a)(3) (requiring that
a chemical be marked with adequate warnings and instructions); § 6(a)(4) (requiring the
manufacturer or processor to retain records of the process used to manufacture the
chemical); § 6(a)(5)-(6) (prohibiting or regulating the method of commercial use and
disposal of the chemical); § 6(a)(7) (requiring the manufacturers or processors of the
chemical to give notice of unreasonable risks to persons in possession of the chemical, to
give public notice of such risk, and to replace or repurchase the chemical). See generally
Carolyne R. Hathaway et al., A Practitioner's Guide to the Toxic Substances Control Act:
Part 11I, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,357, 10,358-63 (July 1994) (discussing
TSCA § 6).
123. DRULEY & ORDWAY, supra note 17, at 33.
124. Id.
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so, the EPA must consider the chemical's effect on health and the
environment, its benefits, the availability of substitutes, and the economic
consequences of the rule.'25 If the EPA determines that another federal
law could eliminate or reduce the risk of injury to health or the
environment, it will not promulgate a rule, unless it is in the public's
interest to regulate the risk under TSCA. 126 Under TSCA section 6, the
EPA may take a number of actions with regard to a hazardous chemical
that poses unreasonable risks: the EPA may prohibit or limit manufac-
ture, use, or disposal; and require warnings, instructions, and notices of
risk of injury to distributors.'27
D. Section Eight of the Toxic Substance Control Act
Section 8 ,12S the general information-gathering provision, allows
the EPA to regulate a manufacturer's actions'29 and make reasoned
judgments on the safety and hazards of all existing chemicals. 3 ' The
section requires chemical manufacturers to submit detailed reports
regarding the chemicals they make.' The EPA uses this information,
along with the PMNs, 32 to compile an inventory of every chemical
125. TSCA § 6(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1). See also TSCA § 2(c); 15 U.S.C.
§ 260 1(c) (requiring the EPA to "consider the environmental, economic, and social impact
of any action the [EPA] takes").
126. TSCA § 6(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1). To determine whether it is in the
public's interest to promulgate a rule, the EPA must consider all relevant aspects of the
risk, such as the relative costs and efficiency of complying with TSCA and other federal
laws. Id. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir.
1991) (rejecting the EPA's rule prohibiting asbestos use because the agency did not give
manufacturers sufficient opportunity to challenge the EPA's data, did not consider less
burdensome alternatives, and did not evaluate toxicity or available substitutes).
127. TSCA § 6(b); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(b). See supra note 122.
128. TSCA § 8; 15 U.S.C. § 2607.
129. See Slusarczuk, supra note 108, at 923 ("[Section 8's] record-keeping
requirements are stringent.").
130. TSCA § 8; 15 U.S.C. § 2607. WOROBEC, supra note 17, at 28. Under § 8 the
EPA may require manufactureres to maintain records and report the name; the molecular
structure; the categories of use of the chemical; the amount to be manufactured; the
byproducts resulting from the manufacture, use, or disposal of the chemical; the existing
data on health or environmental effects; the number of occupational exposures; and the
method of disposal. TSCA § 8(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2).
131. TSCA § 8(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a).
132. See supra part IM.A.
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manufactured in or imported to the United States.'33 In addition,
section 8 requires manufacturers to keep records of all chemicals alleged
to cause a significant adverse reaction to health or the environment.'1 4
Finally, manufacturers must notify the EPA immediately if they obtain
information that shows a particular chemical creates a substantial risk of
injury.135
E. The Enforcement Provisions of the Toxic Substance Control Act
TSCA has several enforcement provisions.'36 Section 11 authoriz-
es the EPA to inspect any establishment, facility, or other premises that
manufactures, processes, or stores chemicals.'37 The EPA has exten-
sive authority to inspect premises to determine whether a manufacturer
is complying with TSCA.3 8 The EPA also has the power to subpoena
both the testimony of witnesses and the production of various re-
ports.13 9 Section 15 ensures a manufacturer complies with section 11.14'
133. TSCA § 8(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b)(1). See also DRULEY & ORDWAY, supra
note 17 at 58 (stating that the EPA will consider any chemical not on the inventory list a
new chemical and thus will require a PMN).
134. TSCA § 8(c); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c). Manufacturers must keep records of
consumer allegations of personal injury, reports of occupational disease or injury, and
complaints of injury to the environment submitted to the manufacturer. Id.
135. TSCA § 8(e); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e).
136. See, e.g., TSCA § 11; 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (allowing the EPA to inspect and
subpoena manufacturers); TSCA § 16; 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (authorizing civil and criminal
penalties for TSCA violations); TSCA § 20; 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (permitting citizens' civil
actions); TSCA § 21; 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (permitting citizens to petition the EPA to ensure
compliance with TSCA). See generally DRULEY & ORDWAY, supra note 17, at 48-54
(discussing enforcement). TSCA also contains a provision authorizing judicial review of
any rule promulgated under TSCA. TSCA § 19; 15 U.S.C. § 2618. See DRULEY &
ORDWAY, supra note 17, at 55-57.
137. TSCA § l1(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a). The EPA also has authority to inspect any
conveyance used to transport the chemicals. Id. The EPA must provide written notice of
the inspection. Id.
138. TSCA § 11(b)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(b)(1) (extending inspections to include
"records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities"). But see TSCA § I l(b)(2); 15
U.S.C. § 2610(b)(2) (prohibiting inspection of financial data, sales data, pricing data,
personnel data, and research data unless such information is described with reasonable
specificity in the written notice of the inspection).
139. TSCA § 11(c); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c).
140. TSCA § 15(4); 15 U.S.C. § 2614(4) (making it unlawful for a manufacturer to
refuse to permit entry or inspection pursuant to section 11). See also TSCA § 16(a); 15
U.S.C. § 2615(a) (permitting the EPA to impose a civil penalty up to a maximum of
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Another enforcement provision, section 21, allows a citizen to
petition the EPA to commence a rulemaking proceeding under sections
4, 5, 6, and 8.'4' A citizen may also petition the EPA to amend, issue,
or repeal an existing rule.142 The EPA, upon receiving a petition, has
ninety days to grant or deny the petition.143  If the EPA grants the
petition, it must commence a proceeding in accordance with sections 4,
5, 6, and 8.144 If the EPA denies the petition or fails to make a
decision, the petitioner has sixty days to file a civil action to compel the
EPA to issue a rule. 45
Finally, section 13 of TSCA 146 applies to importers.'47  Import-
ers must certify, either on the entry documents or invoices, that any
shipment of chemicals complies with TSCA.' 41 Customs and the EPA
work together to ensure that all imported chemicals comply with the
certification requirements of the statute.'49 In addition, the Secretary
of the Treasury may refuse entry to imports if the importer fails to
comply with TSCA's requirements. 50 The Secretary may either
dispose of the chemicals or store them until the manufacturer exports them.'
$20,000 for each day the manufacturer violates section 15). Criminal penalties for
violating § 11 include $25,000 for each day of violation and up to one year imprisonment.
TSCA § 16(b); 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b).
141. TSCA § 21; 15 U.S.C. § 2620.
142. TSCA § 21(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a).
143. TSCA § 21(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(3).
144. Id.
145. TSCA § 21(b)(4)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(4)(A). See § 21(b)(4)(B)(i)(I)
(authorizing the reviewing court to order the EPA to issue a rule or order under §§ 4 or
5 if the EPA does not have sufficient information to permit a reasoned evaluation of the
chemical's effects on health or the environment); § 21(b)(4)(B)(ii) (authorizing a court to
order the EPA to initiate a proceeding under §§ 6 or 8 if such a rule is necessary to protect
health or the environment).
146. TSCA § 13; 15 U.S.C. § 2612.
147. See TSCA § 3(7); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(7) (defining the term "manufacture" to
include importing into the customs territory of the United States).
148. Chemical Substances Import Policy, 40 C.F.t. § 707.20(c)(1)(i) (1995).
149. 40 C.F.R. § 707.20 (c)(2)(i) (allowing customs officials to refuse entry to any
shipment not complying with TSCA and to detain any shipment if there is reasonable
grounds to believe it violates TSCA).
150. TSCA § 13(a)(l); 15 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
151. TSCA § 13(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2612(aX2). The consignee may export the
chemical within 90 days of receiving notice of entry refusal. Id. The Secretary may
release the chemical to the consignee pending a review by the EPA; however, the
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Following the enactment of TSCA, the EPA and the public
generally ignored it.' Rather than using TSCA to prevent pollution,
the EPA focused its attention on the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),"' which
embodies an after-the-fact approach to pollution.'54 CERCLA grants
the EPA the authority to clean up the pollution already in the air, water,
and soil, whereas TSCA grants the EPA authority to prevent the
introduction of harmful substances into the environment. 5
IV. DOES AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAVE THE AUTHORITY
TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS?
Prior to 1940, federal agencies had limited investigatory powers.'56
The Supreme Court asserted that Congress did not intend to permit
agencies to engage in "fishing expeditions into private papers on the
possibility that they may disclose evidence."' '57 During this period, the
Court protected businesses from administrative investigations.'53
Beginning in 1943, however, the Supreme Court began to expand
consignee must execute a bond for the full value of the substance and the duty on the
substance. Id.
152. Hanan, supra note 57, at 408-09 (noting that the EPA regulated or banned "an
insignificant number" of chemicals from 1979 to 1983). See also Ginsburg, supra note
61, at 10,335-36 (discussing the potential of TSCA § 21). For a discussion of the EPA's
enforcement of TSCA, see U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., ASSESSMENT OF NEW CHEMICAL
REGULATION UNDER THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CoNTRoL ACT 20 (1984) (concluding that
the EPA has fallen short of achieving TSCA's goals for new chemicals); What Ever
Happened to the Toxic Substances Control Act?: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1988) (statement
of Charles L. Elkins, Director of the Office of Toxic Substances Committee, EPA).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
154. Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 10,336-37.
155. See id. at 10,337.
156. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 4:1-4:2 (2d ed. 1978).
157. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924) ("It is contrary to the
[Fourth Amendment] to allow a search through all the respondents' records, relevant or
irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up."). In American Tobacco, the FTC
issued petitions for writs of mandamus to two corporations under selected provisions of
the Antitrust Acts. Id. at 303-04. The petition requested the "production of records,
contracts, memoranda and correspondence for inspection and making copies." Id. The
Court noted that a corporation's affairs should not be made public merely because it
engages in interstate commerce. Id. at 305.
158. See DAVIS, supra note 156, §§ 4:1-4:2.
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agencies' investigatory powers.'59
In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,"6 the Supreme Court
considered the validity of a subpoena the Secretary of Labor issued
during an administrative proceeding. 6' The Court enforced the
subpoena because it determined that Congress had granted the Secretary
of Labor, and not the courts, the power to administer the Walsh-Healey
Act.'62 Three years later, when the Supreme Court decided Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,63 it extended the rationale of Endicott
to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and enforced the subpoenas at
issue.'" The Court upheld language in the statute authorizing the
Administrator to "enter and inspect such places and such records ... and
investigate such facts... as he may deem necessary or appropriate."'65
The Court held that no constitutional provisions prohibited the
Administrator from exercising this congressionally granted subpoena
authority."
In EEOC v. Children's Hospital Medical Center of Northern
California,'67 the EEOC sought enforcement of subpoenas it had
issued.'" The Ninth Circuit noted that the scope of judicial review in
159. Id. at 229.
160. 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
161. Id. at 501-02. The Secretary of Labor issued the subpoena pursuant to the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act. Id The recipient did not comply with the subpoenas
and the district court declined to enforce them. Id. at 502. The circuit court of appeals
reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
162. Id. at 507. The Court noted that, without the requested information, the Secretary
was unable to fulfill the purposes of the Act. Id. at 508-09.
163. 327 U.S. 186 (1946). The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor issued subpoenas seeking the production of various documents, so
that the Administrator could determine whether petitioners violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). Id. at 189.
164. Id. at 211.
165. Id. at 199 (quoting § 11 of the FLSA) (internal quotations omitted).
166. Id. at 214. Congress was authorized to grant such powers under the "Necessary
and Proper" clause. Id.
167. 719 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1983). Three black employees filed a racial discrimina-
tion claim with the EEOC. Pursuant to its investigation, the EEOC requested information
from the hospital; however, the hospital refused to comply. Id. at 1427.
168. Id. The hospital resisted the subpoenas, claiming that the EEOC lacked
jurisdiction because of a prior consent decree entered to settle a private class action suit.
Id. The Ninth Circuit decided the case on the issue of the EEOC's authority to investigate,
setting aside the effect of the consent decree. Id. at 1428.
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an agency subpoena enforcement proceeding is "quite narrow.' ' 69 The
court held that prior to enforcing an agency subpoena, a court must
determine whether (1) Congress granted the agency authority to
investigate; (2) the agency followed procedural requirements; and (3) the
agency seeks evidence that is relevant and material to the agency's
investigation. 7 If an agency meets these three requirements, a court
must enforce the subpoena, unless the opposing party can establish that
the inquiry is unreasonably overbroad or unduly burdensome.'
In EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,172 the EPA issued a
subpoena under TSCA to Alyeska Pipeline and sued for its enforce-
ment. 73 The EPA issued the TSCA subpoena while it was reviewing
Alyeska Pipeline's application to renew its permit to operate a ballast
water treatment (BWT) plant under the Clean Water Act (CWA)."'
Alyeska contended that the EPA "improperly used the investigatory
powers under the TSCA to further its CWA investigation of the BWT
plant" because the EPA does not have "the power to issue subpoenas
under the CWA."'175 In response, the EPA argued that it was investi-
gating alleged dumping violations, and that this was "outside the scope
of a CWA relicensing investigation.' ' 76
The Ninth Circuit held that the EPA could exercise its subpoena
authority without having to show a violation of TSCA.'77 The court
stated that an administrative agency has "the power to obtain the facts
requisite to determining whether it has jurisdiction over the matter sought
to be investigated."' 78 In addition, the court noted that an agency did
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Oklahoma
Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)).
171. Children's Hospital, 719 F.2d at 1428.
172. 836 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1988).




177. 4lyeska Pipeline, 836 F.2d at 447. The court distinguished Children's Hospital,
noting that the EEOC's subpoena power may be exercised only in connection with an
investigation of a charge. Id. TSCA does not comparably limit the EPA's subpoena
power. Id.
178. Id. (citation omitted).
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not have to allege a violation of TSCA in order to investigate.'79 In
reaching its decision, the district court applied, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, the Children's Hospital test80 and concluded that the EPA
had the authority to issue subpoenas to the BWT plant under TSCA.' 8,
V. UNDER THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL TEST THE EPA
DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS
TO THE MAQUILADORA PARENT COMPANIES
After the EPA receives a citizens petition, it must decide whether
to grant or deny the petitioner's request for TSCA proceedings whether
within ninety days. 2 In Southern California, petitioners have alleged
that the maquiladoras in Mexicali, Mexico dump chemicals into the New
River. 3 The petitioners have further alleged that the parent compa-
nies, through the maquiladoras, import these chemicals into the United
States.' 84 Thus, they assert, section 13 applies to the
maquiladoras.'85 Section 13 requires that all chemicals entering the
United States comply with TSCA.' However, if another federal law
administered by the EPA applies to the complaint, the EPA is to defer
to that authority, unless it believes that it is in the public interest to
179. Id.
180. Id. at 446. See supra text accompanying note 170 (detailing the Children's
Hospital test).
181. Alyeska Pipeline, 836 F.2d at 446. Alyeska argued that the EPA's requests for
documents were not relevant to an investigation under TSCA. Id. at 445-46. Specifically,
it argued that only PCBs and "imminently hazardous" chemicals, not oil spills, are within
the scope of TSCA. Id. The court, however, determined that Congress designed TSCA
to cover the "regulation of all chemical substances," and concluded the requested
documents were relevant to the TSCA investigation. Id. (citing Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
182. TSCA § 21(bX3); 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(3). Because TSCA § 21 does not specify
how the EPA is to decide whether to grant the petition, the EPA turns to the specific
TSCA provisions and determines whether the specific standard are met. See Response to
Petition, supra note 16, at 13,722 (discussing § 4 standards to determine whether to grant
a citizens' petition).
183. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,721.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. TSCA § 13(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). See supra notes 146-51 and
accompanying text.
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protect against an unreasonable risk by enforcing TSCA. s7
Although the maquiladoras are located in Mexico, the EPA, pursuant
to its subpeona power in section 1 1,188 issued subpoenas to the parent
companies in the United States." 9 Under section 11, the EPA has the
power to obtain the essential facts of an allegation prior to determining
whether it has jurisdiction over that action,' and prior to proving a
manufacturer has violated TSCA.' 9' The EPA can request the produc-
tion of reports, papers, documents, answers to questions, and other
information it deems necessary.'92 The actual subpoenas issued to the
American parent companies sought information to determine whether
their chemicals were entering the New River. 93 This Note proposes
that, under the Children's Hospital test, 94 the EPA did not have the
authority to issue these subpoenas.
Even though the companies have already responded to the subpoe-
nas,' 95 the subpoenas were not self-enforcing,"9 and the recipients
187. TSCA § 9(b); 15 U.S.C. § 2608(b).
188. TSCA § 11; 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (granting the EPA the power to inspect and
subpoena). See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
189. Telephone Interview with Michele Price, Environmental Assistance Division,
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, EPA (Feb. 21, 1995).
190. EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1988) ("An
independent regulatory administrative agency has the power to obtain the facts requisite
to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter sought to be investigated.")
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d
431, 434 (9th Cir. 1975)).
191. Id. (permitting the EPA to exercise its subpoena authority merely on the suspicion
of a violation) (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)).
192. TSCA § 11(c); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c).
193. Letter from Lynn R. Goldman, M.D., EPA, to the 95 Subpoenaed Companies
(Sept. 21, 1994) (on file with author). The EPA asked 26 questions. Administrative
Subpoena Duces Tecum, supra note 18, at 7-9. The EPA requested the name of each
chemical substance likely to be released into the water, a brief description of its use and
the quantity used, manufactured, or processed by the facility during 1993; and the
maximum amount of the chemical on-site at any one time during 1993. Id. at 7. The
EPA additionally requested the name and quantity of each chemical substance exported
to the maquiladora during 1993, whether it was released into the water, and whether the
export continued in 1994. Id.
194. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Letter from Stanley W. Landfair, Counsel representing Ralston Purina
Company, to Lynn R. Goldman, Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides and
Toxic Substances, EPA (Jan. 6, 1995) (on file with author) (accepting the EPA's offer to
withdraw the subpoena in exchange for voluntary answers to questions).
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did not have to comply without federal court orders.'97 This Note
proposes that if a federal court had been asked to enforce the subpoenas,
it could not have ordered compliance for two reasons: First, Congress
did not grant the EPA the authority to use TSCA as a vehicle to
investigate the chemicals polluting a foreign river. Second, even if
Congress did grant the EPA the authority to use TSCA to investigate the
chemicals, the EPA did not follow the proper procedural requirements.
A. Congress Did Not Grant the EPA the Authority to Investigate
Chemicals Polluting Foreign Water Systems Under TSCA
Section 11 explicitly authorizes the EPA to make inspections and
issue subpoenas." It may inspect any facility that manufacturers or
stores chemical substances before or after the company distributes the
chemicals into commerce.'" Section I I also permits the EPA to
subpoena the testimony of witnesses and the production of reports and
other information necessary to enforce TSCA. °° The critical issue,
however, is whether Congress intended to give the EPA authority to
subpoena the American parent companies for information that only the
maquiladoras operating in Mexico possess.
Traditionally, "federal statutes apply only to conduct within, or
having effect within, the territory of the United States, unless the
contrary is clearly indicated in the statute."' ' This general presump-
196. See EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. 836 F.2d. 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1988) ("An
EPA subpoena is not self-enforcing.").
197. Id. See also TSCA § 11(c); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c).
198. TSCA § 11; 15 U.S.C. § 2610.
199. See TSCA § 11(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a) (extending power to inspect to any
conveyance being used to transport chemical substances in connection with distribution in
commerce). But see TSCA § l1(b)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(b)(2) (exempting from
inspection financial data, sales data, pricing data, personnel data, or research data).
200. TSCA § 11 (c); 15 U.S.C. § 2610(c).
201. Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 589, 630 (1990) (citing
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.R.C. 631,637 (1980)) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1986)
(applying statutes prohibiting narcotics importation to conduct occurring entirely outside
the United States, based on an explicit provision in the statute). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38
(1965) (stating that United States statutory law applies only to conduct occurring within
the territory of the United States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute).
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tion against the extraterritorial application 2 of federal statues honors
national sovereignty and avoids unintended clashes between the laws of
the United States and those of another nation."'3 Before a court can
determine that a statute extends extraterritorially, it must find "a clear
expression of congressional intent."2"
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission,05 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
considered whether, in granting Westinghouse a license to export a
nuclear reactor to the Philippines, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) erred by failing to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).2' The court had to determine whether the NRC
was required to consider consequences in a foreign land27 and whether
such consideration constitutes an extraterritorial application of United
202. Extraterritoriality is a jurisdictional concept regarding one nations' authority to
adjudicate the rights of particular parties and to establish the norms of conduct outside its
borders. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
rev'g 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991).
203. Massey, 986 F.2d at 530; Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892 F.2d
1271, 1272 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply Title VII extraterritorially because "respect
for the right of nations to regulate conduct within their own borders is a fundamental
concept of sovereignty"), aff'd sub nom., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991). See also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (finding no
indication that other sovereigns gave the United States authority to regulate labor laws or
customs in Iran or Iraq); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S 347, 356
(1909) ("For another jurisdiction ... to treat [a criminal] according to its own notions
rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would
be an interference with the authority of another sovereign. .. ."). But see Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 439 (1932) (finding that the actual service of a subpoena to
a United States citizen in a foreign country does not invade the foreign government's
sovereignty); Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944) (exercising the United States
sovereign control over its commerce and the acts of its resident citizens is not an invasion
of the sovereignty of any other country or an attempt to act beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States).
204. See Turley, supra note 201, at 627.
205. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
206. Id. at 1353. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorized Westing-
house to export the reactor. Id. at 1348. The petitioners argued that the NRC did not
prepare a "site-specific environmental impact statement" which is required under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). Id. at 1355. The Commission,
however, argued that this statement was required only for "major federal actions occurring
within, or having effects upon, the United States itself." Id.
207. Id.
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States law.2" Courts will uphold such an application given "an
unequivocal mandate from Congress" that an agency consider foreign
environmental impacts.' After examining NEPA's legislative history
and judicial precedent, the court concluded that NEPA did not apply
extraterritorially in this instance to prevent the NRC's action in granting
the export license."'
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey,21' the D.C.
Circuit noted two other exceptions to the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of a federal statute.' First, the presumption
is surmounted if the failure to extend the statute to a foreign setting will
adversely effect the United States." 3 Second, one can overcome the
presumption if the conduct that the agency wants to regulate occurs
within the United States."4 In order for the EPA to subpoena records
208. Id. at 1356.
209. Id. at 1357.
210. Id. at 1366-68.
211. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
212. Id. at 531.
213. Id. See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952) (applying
the Lanham Trade-Mark Act extraterritorially to a United States national because his
operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of the foreign
nation); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921-22
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (extending United States antitrust laws extraterritorially because the
economic consequences of the alleged actions significantly impaired American interests).
Congress has enacted legislation to permit the government to defend itself against
obstruction or fraud committed by its own citizens abroad. See United States v. Harvey,
2 F.3d 1318, 1329 n.13 (3d Cir. 1993) (extending the Protection of Children from Sexual
Exploitation Act extraterritorially because the dissemination of child pornography relies
heavily on the mail system, and other instrumentalities of interstate and foreign
commerce); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (extending the
Securities Exchange Act extraterritorially to protect American investors who purchase
foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market
from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969), afrd in part and rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (1968). See generally
CHARLES C. HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES § 240 (1922) (noting that a State may punish its nationals for
disobeying its commands while within a foreign country); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 145 (Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928) ("The Law of Nations does not prevent
a State from exercising jurisdiction over its subjects travelling or residing abroad, since
they remain under its personal supremacy.").
214. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. This exception does not apply in the scenario presented
in this Note because the conduct, disposing chemicals into the New River, occurs outside
of the United States.
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located in Mexico, it must prove that TSCA extends extraterritorially.
Although Congress does not have to state explicitly that the statute
applies extraterritorially," 5 there must be an "unequivocal mandate
from Congress" prior to extending the statute beyond United States bor-
ders.216
TSCA does not compel extraterritorial application. Its purpose is to
prevent the manufacture, processing, and distribution of chemicals that
pose an unreasonable risk to health and the environment.2 '7  TSCA
does not give the EPA jurisdiction over the movement of all chemicals
that cross the borders via rivers, air, or other natural means.1 Con-
gress adopted this statute to regulate the safe use of all raw materials
rather than to control the finished products or waste.219 Congress
intended TSCA to require the EPA to examine all chemicals prior to
their manufacture.' 0 The EPA can enforce TSCA without extending
the statute to the maquiladoras in Mexico by regulating the chemicals the
maquiladoras intend to import into the United States. The EPA issued
the subpoenas in order to identify the pollutants in the New River. This
purpose, however, did not coincide with the goals of TSCA. The
subpoenas act as an after-the-fact approach to solving the pollution
problem, whereas Congress designed TSCA to be preventive.22'
215. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S 94,98-99 (1922) (holding that the false claims
provision of the Criminal Code applies on the high seas even though the statute does not
explicitly mention extraterritorial application).
216. Turley, supra note 201, at 630-31 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). See, e.g., Private
Correspondence with Foreign Governments, 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1994) (forbidding U.S.
citizens, wherever they may be, from corresponding with foreign governments to influence
or defeat U.S. measures); Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C.
§ 5001(5)(A) (1988) (repealed 1993) (defining a national of the United States as any
natural person who is a citizen of the United States); Id. § 5055(a) (forbidding any
national of the United States to make or approve loans to the government of South Africa);
Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2415(2) (1988) (defining a "United States
person" to mean any United States resident or national, any domestic concern and any
foreign subsidiary or affiliate of any domestic concern).
217. See supra part III for a discussion of the purposes of TSCA.
218. Comments of the American Automobile Manufacturers Association on Section
21 Petition Filed by the Environmental Health Coalition 2 (May 23, 1994) (on file with
author) (arguing that TSCA applies only to conventional import activities).
219. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
221. See Ginsburg, supra note 61, at 10,336-37.
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The petitioners alleged that Congress intended TSCA to apply in
this case because the chemicals in the New River were imports.'
Section 13 gives the EPA authority to examine all chemicals entering the
United States.' Prior to importing any chemicals, an importer must
comply with all provisions of TSCA; if it fails to comply, the Secretary
of the Treasury may refuse the chemicals entry. 4 Therefore, TSCA
does not require extraterritorial application because the statute provides
a mechanism for regulating imported chemicals.
In Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon,225 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that courts should apply the ordinary meaning of importation
rather than a technical meaning. 6 Under TSCA, an importer is any
person who imports a chemical substance, whether part of a mixture or
article, into the customs territory of the United States.227 An import is
a product manufactured in a foreign country, and then shipped to and
sold in the United States. 8 Thus, the purpose of importation is to sell
222. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,721.
223. TSCA § 13; 15 U.S.C. § 2612. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
224. TSCA § 13; 15 U.S.C. § 2612. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
225. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
226. Id. at 121-22 (defining importation to mean bringing into the United States an
article from outside, regardless of the mode). See also Biddle Sawyer Corp., No. 11-
TSCA-TST-88-0244, 1991 WL 209856, EPA at *3 (E.P.A. Aug. 21, 1991) (rejecting
EPA's argument that importation does not cease with the act of entering the United States,
but continues until the importer sells or otherwise no longer has control or possession of
the substance); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 755 (6th ed. 1990) (defining importation as
the act of bringing goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign country).
227. Premanufacture Notification, 40 C.F.R. § 720.3() (1995) ("Importer includes the
person primarily liable for the payment of any duties on the merchandise."). Id.
"Importer" includes the consignee, the importer of record, the actual owner if an owner's
declaration and superseding bond has been filed, or the transferee if the right to draw
merchandise in a bonded warehouse has been transferred. Id. TSCA § 3 includes
importing in the definition of "manufacture." TSCA § 3(7); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(7).
228. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 755 (6th ed. 1990). See North American Free
Trade, 19 U.S.C. § 3421(i)(IXA) (1994) (defining imports to mean "any meat, poultry,
other food, animal, or plant that is imported into the United States in commercially
significant quantities"); Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (1994)
(defining import to mean "any bringing in or introduction of [any] article into any area");
Waring v. Mayor of the City of Mobile, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110, 117 (1868) ("Imported
goods may be entered for consumption or for warehousing. .. ."); Income Taxes, 26
C.F.R. § 1.1059A-l(b)(1) (defining import as the "filing of the entry documentation
required by the U.S. Customs Service to secure the release of imported merchandise from
custody of the U.S. Customs Service"); General Reporting and Record Keeping
Requirement, 40 C.F.R. § 704.3 (defining "import for commercial purposes" as import
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products in the United States.
Pollution in a foreign river does not have the same attributes as an
import. The definition of an import clearly implies that it is a tangible
and physical product.229 Pollution, on the other hand, is defined as the
"[c]ontamination of the environment by ... hazardous substances,
organic wastes and toxic chemicals."" 0 Pollution in a river is not a
good-an article or a piece of merchandise-nor is it sold in the United
States. Likewise, pollution is not subject to customs duties"1 or
inspections; 2 nor is it shipped to an importer of record for collec-
"with the purpose of obtaining an immediate or eventual commercial advantage for the
importer"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1135 (3d ed. 1986)
(defining import as "to bring from a foreign or external source"). See also Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (1994) (defining "article" to mean any "commodity, whether
grown, produced, fabricated, manipulated, or manufactured"); Id. § 1401(c) (defining
"merchandise" as "goods, wares, and chattels of every description," including prohibited
imports); The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 114 (1897) (referring to articles, goods, wares, and
merchandise as words having a similar meaning under tariff acts); United States v.
Kushner, 135 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir.) (defining gold bullion as merchandise), cer. denied,
320 U.S. 212 (1943); Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1931)
(defining property brought in for the importer's personal use and consumption as
merchandise under the TariffAct); Lozano v. United States, 17 F.2d 7, 8-9 (5th Cir. 1927)
(defining a foreign coin as merchandise under the Tariff Act); United States v. Mattio, 17
F.2d 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1927) (restricting the definition of merchandise under the Tariff
Act to exclude personal effects and jewelry). Cf Letter from Warren U. Lehrenbaum,
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, to Mark A. Greenwood, Director, Office of Pollution
Prevention and Toxics, EPA 3 (May 25, 1994) (on file with author) (arguing that a person
is not an importer of a substance if he utilized the substance abroad and it comes back into
the United States as a pollutant).
229. See supra note 228.
230. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990). See also Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994) (defining "pollutant," inter alia, as chemical wastes, biological
materials, radioactive materials, and heat); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F.
Supp. 1291, 1306 (D.D.C.) (extending the definition of pollution under the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System to include "man-made or man-induced alteration
of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water"), rev'd on other
grounds, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982); State, Dept. of Ecology v. PUD No. I of
Jefferson County, Wash., 849 P.2d 646, 650 (Wash. 1993) (defining pollution understate's
Water Quality Standards to mean man-induced alteration of streamflow level), affd, 114
S. Ct. 1900 (1994).
231. "Customs duties" are defined as "[tiaxes on the importation'and exportation of
commodities, merchandise and other goods." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 386 (6th ed.
1990).
232. See United States v. Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 164 (1st Cir. 1991)
(providing that "all persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in the Customs territory
of the United States from places outside ... are liable to inspection and search by a
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tion.233
The language of the statute does not support the argument that
pollution is an import. TSCA presupposes that the regulated substance
is exported from a foreign location to a port of entry located in the
United States, where the "importer of record" 4 collects the shipment
after Customs certifies the shipment complies with TSCA."5  Under
section 13 of TSCA, Customs must inspect the importer's certified
statement, entry documents, or invoices.236 If the Secretary of the
Treasury refuses entry to a chemical because the manufacturer failed to
comply with TSCA, the Secretary must either dispose of or store the
chemical until it is exported back to the originating country.237 Thus,
by implication, the agents in the "customs territory" has the capacity to
separate, detain, and store banned imports.
Congress did not intend for the Secretary of the Treasury to detain
the rivers flowing into the United States if they contain hazardous
chemical substances. Furthermore, Congress did not direct the Secretary
to examine every river, stream, lake, or ocean shore bordering the United
States for chemicals that may pose an unreasonable risk to health or the
environment. Rather, TSCA requires the Secretary to examine only the
invoices, documents, and imports for compliance with the statute. 8
If Congress wants legislation to extend to other jurisdictions, it must
make a clear statement of the statute's extraterritorial application.239
TSCA does not mention international or foreign concerns. Except for
section 12,24 TSCA does not use the words "foreign," "international,"
Customs officer") (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (1990)).
233. See 40 C.F.R. § 720.3(l) (1995) (defining importer to include the importer of
record).
234. Id.
235. TSCA § 13; 15 U.S.C. § 2612 (directing Secretary of the Treasury to refuse entry
to chemical substances that fail to comply with TSCA); 40 C.F.R. § 707.20(c)(I)(i) (1995)
(same); Reporting Requirements, 19 C.F.R. § 12.121(a) (1995) (requiring importers to
certify that chemical shipments comply with TSCA).
236. 19 C.F.R. § 12.121(a) (1995).
237. 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.122-12.127 (discussing procedures to prevent entry).
238. 19 C.F.R. § 12.121(a) (requiring the importer to certify compliance with TSCA
with the director of the port of entry prior to shipment).
239. See supra notes 201-16 and accompanying text.
240. TSCA § 12(bX 1); 15 U.S.C. § 2611 (b)(1) (requiring a person who plans to export
chemicals substances into a foreign country to notify the EPA of their intentions so that
the EPA can notify the foreign government).
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or "extraterritorially." In addition, courts have held that TSCA deals
with the national, not international, economic impact of rules issued
under TSCA.24 International concerns are "conspicuously absent"
from the statute.242 Thus, a court must give great weight to the EPA's
decision to ignore the international effects of its actions.243
In addition, Congress, when promulgating environmental legislation,
is presumed to respect other sovereigns' authority to protect and exploit
their own resources.2" Other sovereigns "may strike balances of
interests that differ substantially" from those of Congress.245  The
international community should resolve environmental problems through
negotiation and agreement rather than through the extraterritorial
imposition of one nation's laws.246
B. Even if Congress Intended TSCA to Apply Extraterritorially,
the EPA Must Follow the Proper Procedural Requirements
to Meet Children's Hospital's Second Requirement
After the EPA receives a citizens petition requesting a section 4 test,
it has ninety days to decide whether it will grant the petition.247 In the
New River case, the EPA denied the petition because it believed it first
had to characterize the chemical contamination in the river, and that a
section 4 test rule was not the best or most expeditious way to obtain the
241. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1209-10 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that foreign entities lack standing under TSCA to challenge a rule). See
generally Laura M. Helinski, Casenote, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental
Protection Agency: Compliance with Rulemaking Procedures, 2 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L.
203 (1992) (analyzing the Fifth Circuit's decision and holding).
242. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1209.
243. Id. at 1210. See also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971)
("It is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a
regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute.").
244. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977).
245. Id. Some theorists argue that underdeveloped countries cannot simultaneously
address economic growth and environmental protection. See H. Jeffrey Leonard,
Overview, in ENVIRONMENT AND THE POOR: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR A COMMON
AGENDA 3, 4 (H. Jeffrey Leonard et al. eds., 1989). Thus, the argument goes, poor
countries must accept "long-term environmental degradation to meet their immediate needs
for food and shelter." Id.
246. Id.
247. TSCA § 21(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 2620(b)(3).
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necessary information.24 Due to the complexity of the various legal
issues, the EPA first concluded that it would take several years to initiate
and complete the test rule.249 In addition, section 4 rulemaking would
delay tracking the planned improvements in the maquiladoras' treatment
facilities.' Finally, a test rule may not cover all of the petitioners'
concerns because of the limited scope of TSCA."' The EPA also
denied the petitioners' request to impose a test rule to evaluate the
ecological and health risks of the river's pollutants.252 The EPA agreed
instead to work with the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) to gather the data necessary to assess the ecological
and health effects of the New River. 3
A section 4 test is necessary when: (1) insufficient information
exists to assess the effects of the chemicals; (2) the test will develop the
necessary information; and (3) the chemical presents an unreasonable risk
of injury to health or the environment. 4 If the EPA is unable to
determine whether the chemical poses a risk because the available
information is inadequate and insufficient, it must promptly commence
an appropriate proceeding under TSCA. 55 In addition, once the EPA
proceeds under TSCA, it should comply with the policy of TSCA,
which holds the chemical manufacturers responsible for gathering the
data necessary to determine whether the chemical poses an unreasonable
248. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,723. If the EPA denies a petition it
must publish its reasons in the Federal Register. TSCA § 21(b)(3); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2620(b)(3).
249. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,723.
250. Id. The section 4 test rule would also prevent the EPA from immediately
identifying possible unknown risks currently in the New River. Id.
251. Id. For example, the section 4 test ruling may not permit E. coli testing because
it would be difficult to identify manufacturers, importers, or processors who would be
subject to a rule. Id.
252. Id. at 13,721.
253. Id. at 13,723. In accordance with the La Paz Agreement, supra note 4, the EPA
is taking other actions regarding the United States-Mexican border. The EPA will provide
financial assistance to monitor the New River, and will discuss a monitoring program with
Mexico. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,723. The EPA will also work with
Mexico on the wastewater treatment plant in the Mexicali area. Id. at 13,724. Finally, the
EPA is taking action to collect information on the nature of the pollutants from
California-based parent companies of maquiladoras, and is seeking information from
SEDESOL. Id.
254. TSCA § 4(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a).
255. Id.
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risk."6 Congress intended that the EPA would exercise its subpoena
power only after it concluded that the information obtained through
voluntary means was inadequate to enforce compliance with TSCA.257
The EPA denied a section 4 test even though it had insufficient
information, and even after it concluded that the New River may present
an unreasonable risky 8 The EPA acknowledged that the information
it had was several years old and did not reflect the present conditions of
the New River, and that the previous samples could not definitively
determine the identity or source of the pollution.259 The EPA admitted
that it could only determine whether a section 4 test was appropriate after
it received and evaluated the up-to-date monitoring information on the
identities, levels, and environmental partitioning of the pollutants in the
river.2" Because the EPA determined that it did not have sufficient
information, under section 4, it should have granted a test rule. By
failing to do so, the EPA violated TSCA procedures.
TSCA's purpose is to grant the EPA proper authority to regulate,
prior to manufacturing, chemicals that may present an unreasonable risk
to health and the environment. All manufacturers who want to develop
or introduce a new chemical into the market must submit a PMN,26'
and if the EPA does not have sufficient information concerning the
chemical, it can, under TSCA section 4, require the manufacturer to test
the chemical and supply the necessary information to the EPA. In this
instance, the EPA instead agreed to gather this necessary information by
other means, violating TSCA's policy of requiring manufacturers to
supply the information.262
When a manufacturer fails to comply with TSCA, the EPA can
utilize TSCA's enforcement provisions. Section I I gives the EPA the
ability to inspect any establishment or facility that manufactures
chemicals. Section 11 also allows the EPA to subpoena the production
256. TSCA § 4(b)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(3).
257. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LAW AND
EXPLANATION 611 (1977).
258. Response to Petition, supra note 16, at 13,723 ("[T]he Agency recognizes that
the New River may be a significant source of human exposure to an unquantified mixture
of industrial and chemical pollutants.").
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See supra part III.A.
262. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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of documents it deems necessary to oversee TSCA.2 6  Congress
designed this section to help the EPA administer and enforce TSCA;
however, because the EPA declined to grant a section 4 screen test, it
was not administering or enforcing a provision under TSCA. Therefore,
the EPA had no basis on which to issue subpoenas to the parent
companies."6
C. Even if the EPA Followed the Proper Procedures, it Does Not
Have the Power to Enforce TSCA Regulations
Although Alyeska Pipeline permits the EPA to exercise its subpoena
authority without showing a violation of TSCA,265 in that case the EPA
had jurisdiction to enforce any TSCA regulations because Alyeska was
located in the United States, and was thus subject to the EPA's regula-
tions under TSCA. The maquiladoras, by contrast, are located in
Mexico, incorporated under Mexican law, and are citizens of Mexico.
Therefore, even if the EPA received valuable information from the
American parent companies that the chemicals the maquiladoras
discharged into a water system created an unreasonable risk, the EPA
could not extend its regulations beyond the borders of the United
States.26
VI. CONCLUSION
The American parent companies operating maquiladoras should not
have complied with the EPA's subpoenas because the EPA violated the
Children's Hospital test.267 Although Congress granted the EPA the
authority to subpoena companies who have not complied with TSCA,
Congress did not intend for the TSCA regulations to extend
extraterritorially. The plain language does not extend the statute
extraterritorially, and the nature of the statute does not require extraterri-
263. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
264. But see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) ("[An
agency] can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not."); EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 1988) (imposing no requirement that subpoenas issue only to investigate
discrete charges of violations of the law).
265. Alyeska Pipeline, 836 F.2d at 447.
266. See supra part V.A for a discussion of the extraterritorial application of TSCA.
267. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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torial application. Finally, the EPA did not follow the procedures and
underlying policies of TSCA.
The courts should only enforce EPA subpoenas where the EPA
establishes that it would have jurisdiction to regulate under TSCA.
Otherwise, the EPA would have the power to subpoena American parent
companies without having the power to enforce its regulations. In effect,
this would give the EPA unlimited authority to gather information
concerning American subsidiaries located abroad.
Martha M. Neville*
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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